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I. INTRODUCTION

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951
Convention) is the centerpiece of the current system of international
protection and is almost unique in its level of acceptance by states. 2 Its
key definitional clause, article l(A)(2), extends refugee status to any
person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence
is unable
3
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
It is widely believed that this passage extends refugee status only to
persons with a well-founded fear of persecution. Since this is the central
inclusion clause of the 1951 Convention, it is therefore widely believed

that a well-founded fear of persecution is a necessary condition for status
as a Convention refugee, for persons with a nationality as well as those
without one. This view is expressed in the preponderance of
contemporary scholarship, and it is often taken for granted in judicial
interpretation and asylum practice.4 This view is so entrenched that, for

2. Close to 150 nations have ratified either, or both, the 1951 Convention and its Protocol.
See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], States Parties to the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Apr. 1, 2011). International protection
includes the Refugee Convention, but also such instruments as the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85, as well as the immigration laws of various states such as, for example, Temporary Protected
Status in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a. UNHCR is attempting to strengthen protection for
non-refugee stateless persons by enabling them to qualify for resettlement. However, there is no
right to resettlement and, so far, the resettlement of non-refugee stateless persons is left to the
discretion of states. See U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, Basic Procedures to Follow in
Processing Resettlement Submission, in UNHCR RESETrLEMENT HANDBOOK 299, 306 (July
2011).
3. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. The Convention is quoted as modified by
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2), Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (removing the temporal restriction in the 1951 Convention) [hereinafter 1967
Protocol].
4. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. AUDIOvIsuAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008).
See also U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Proceduresand
Criteriafor Determining Refugee Status: Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N.H.C.R. Doc. HCR/IP/4/ENG/REV (Dec. 3, 2011)
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example, the literature on whether climate change displaces might count
as 1951 Convention refugees
is primarily about whether climate change
5
counts as persecution.
Our aim in this Article is to challenge this standard interpretation in
its application to some stateless persons. We shall argue that the clause
of article l(A)(2) following the semicolon and pertaining to stateless
persons, makes room for a certain class of stateless refugees who are not
persecuted. The issue turns on the interpretation of the phrase "unable to
return." According to the standard interpretation, "unable to return"
applies in a very wide range of ordinary cases of statelessness, even to
those whose inability is temporary. For this reason, proponents of the
standard interpretation of the 1951 Convention assume that, despite the
text failing to make this clear, some further restriction must apply to
persons who lack a nationality and are unable to return if they are to count
as refugees:6 they must in addition have a well-founded fear of
persecution.
Our interpretation instead takes "unable to return" to have a far more
stringent meaning than is usually supposed, specifying a more permanent
condition that many stateless persons do not meet, but which suffices for
refugee status for stateless persons who do meet it. On our interpretation,
"unable to return" as it occurs in the clause following the semicolon must
be understood as a legal term of art that signals irreparable, fundamental
inability, rather than mere difficulty or complication with the paperwork.
On our interpretation there is no need to read any restriction to
persecution into the clause following the semicolon for those unable to
return, but it does not follow that all displaced stateless persons are
refugees. Also, on our interpretation, but not the standard interpretation,
the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention is in harmony with its
ordinary meaning, and the complementary relation between the 1951
Convention and the international protection regime is clearer. Finally,
though there is a superficial tension between our interpretation and state
practice, no municipal court or regional agreement explicitly rules against
our interpretation of the 1951 Convention, meaning that there is no deep
tension.7
(establishing persecution to be central to the determination of refugee status) [hereinafter
Handbook on Procedures].
5. E.g., U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Division of International
Protection, Climate Change Displacement and InternationalLaw: Complementary Protection
Standards, 13, U.N.H.C.R. Doc. PPLA/2011/03 (May 2011) (by Jane McAdam) [hereinafter
McAdam]. See also Aurelie Lopez, The Protection of Environmentally-DisplacedPersons in
InternationalLaw, 37 ENVTL. L. 365, 377-80 (2007).
6. See, e.g., McAdam, supra note 5, at 12.
7. We discuss the case law at length in Part IV below. We will argue that rulings in cases
like Revenko v. Sec'y ofStatefor the Home Dep 't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500 (U.K.), Ministerfor
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Savvin (2000), F.C.A. 478 (Austl.), Thabet v. Canada
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Still, this dispute is more than merely academic. If sea level rise causes
small island nations such as the Maldives and Kiribati to be
uninhabitable, those who are thereby rendered stateless will count as
1951 Convention refugees if our interpretation is correct, even though
climate change is not persecution, but they will not count as 1951
Convention refugees if the standard interpretation is correct.
Our Article divides into five parts (including this introduction). Our
first topic will be the actual grammar and ordinary meaning of the 1951
Convention. The ordinary meaning of the clause of the text following the
semicolon suggests that those who lack a nationality (i.e., are formally
stateless 8) and are unable to return to their country of former habitual
residence count as refugees whether or not they are persecuted. 9 Though
there is some prima facie ambiguity in the wording of the text, on
grammatical grounds, there is no restriction to persecution for stateless
persons who are unable to return to their country of former habitual
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 4 F.C. 21 (Can.), Refigee Status Appeals
Authority, Appeal No. 72635/01 (2002) (N.Z.), and R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex
parte Adan, [1999] 1 A.C. 293 (H.L.) though they all deny refugee status to un-persecuted
claimants pleading inability to return, they all grant that the claimants in question are unable to
return, treating a temporary inability to return sufficient for the Convention standard of inability
to return. This is an open issue. Accordingly it is consistent with our interpretation that claimants
in these cases do not qualify for refugee status. But none of these courts consider our
interpretation, and so their rulings cannot be regarded as dispositive against it.
8. Because both terms show up in salient documents, we must both use the term
"stateless" and the term "lack of nationality." The drafters of the 1951 Convention used these
terms interchangeably in discussion, and in the context of discussing their remarks, as context
requires, we shall do the same. The notion at issue here is the notion of de jure statelessness. This
is defined in article 1.1 of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, June
6, 1960, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 and reiterated by the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, Dec. 13, 1975, 989 U.N.T.S. 175. According to these documents, a person is de
jure stateless if they are "not considered a national by any State under the operation of its law.
Note that, as it is defined in the 1954 Statelessness Convention, to lack a nationality owing to the
operation of law is a negative claim: there is no requirement that one is barred from nationality
by an act of law; the only requirement is that no law exists which grants one nationality. De jure
statelessness contrasts with de facto statelessness; the condition of lacking an effective nationality.
All refugees are de facto stateless. Accordingly, the contrast relevant within l(A)2 is the contrast
between those refugees who are de jure stateless and those who are not.
9. In this Article, we will apply the most commonly accepted methods of treaty
interpretation, in particular the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. We do not take a stand
on the relative merits of different approaches, as our reading of the 1951 Convention is consistent
with all standard methods. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties]. See also
Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation:With Special Reference to the
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, in THE LAW
OF TREATIES, LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 297, 299-304 (Scott Davidson, ed.
2004) (discussing the merits of various approaches to treaty interpretation); TREATIES AND
SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 5-8 (Georg Nolte, ed., 2013) (discussing modification through state
practice).
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residence. A reading that restricts refugee status to persecuted stateless
persons is therefore not in accord with the ordinary meaning of the text.
If the drafters meant for there to be a restriction to persecuted persons in
this clause, then the wording of 1(A)(2) is not only highly misleading, but
also suffers from basic, easily avoidable grammatical flaws. We argue for
this in Part II.
The text is at best ambiguous on the requirement of persecution for
stateless persons; a point some courts have conceded.' 0 According to
modem treaty interpretation, however, we ought to interpret and
implement a convention in light of its broader purpose, even when this
conflicts with the literal construction of the text. This has indeed more
generally been the accepted interpretive approach. 1
To justify the standard interpretation of article 1(A)(2), attention is
usually drawn to the focus on persecution in the text of the 1951
Convention as a whole, as well as to the opinions of refugee scholars and
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), such as in this
statement:
Grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of human
rights 1948, which recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum
from persecution in other countries, the United Nations
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in 21951, is
the centrepiece of international refugee protection today.'
Attention is also drawn to those passages in the travaux in which it is
made clear that the decision was taken to draft a separate convention for

10. See Revenko v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500 (U.K.)
(quoting Horvath v. Sec'y of State [2000] 3 W.L.R. 379 (U.K.)); R v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't, Exparte Adan, [1999] 1 A.C. 293, 304B (H.L.); Ministerfor Immigration & Multicultural
Affairs v Savvin (& statement by Katz J. as of 26 Apr. 2000) (2000), 98 F.C.R. 168,
8, 24
(Austi.).
11.

See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 839 (6th ed., 2008); Jacobs,

supra note 9, at 297; Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpretingthe Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV.
733 (1998) (discussing different approaches to the interpretation of the 1951 Convention). But
other courts adhere to an approach more consonant with a textualist interpretation. This is the
situation in the United States: "it is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute
ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence or word
shall be superfluous, void or insignificant." Williams v. Taylor, Warden, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In
re Arizona Appetito's Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 216, 219 (9th Cir. 1990). See also GuY S. GOODWINGILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-9 (2007) (discussing the various

methods of interpreting the 1951 Convention employed by municipal courts).
12. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, Introductory Note to the Convention and
ProtocolRelating to the Status of Refugees, in CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES 2 (Dec. 2010).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

5

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26

3
stateless persons so as not to count all stateless persons as refugees.'
In Part III, we address these arguments to show that this standard
reading of the 1951 Convention's broader purpose is incorrect. We will
carry out a careful examination of the text of the 1951 Convention as a
whole including its preamble, the travaux, the changes made to the draft
convention by the U.N. General Assembly, and the legal antecedents of
the 1951 Convention, such as the mandate of the U.N. Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration and the mandate of the Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees, as well as the International Refugee
Organization (IRO) Constitution and previous refugee agreements. We
will also look at relevant later documents, such as the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as the 1954 Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness (Statelessness Conventions). We will find
that the standard interpretation misconstrues the broader purpose of the
1951 Convention, and by extension the protection regime for 4stateless
persons, including, importantly, the Statelessness Conventions.'
We will suggest that it is consistent with the object and purpose of the
1951 Convention and the aims of the international protection regime as a
whole, to allow that persecution is not a necessary condition on refugee
status for displaced -stateless persons who are truly unable to return to
their countries of former habitual residence. This is not to suggest that all
stateless persons outside their country of former habitual residence are
actually refugees and qualify for asylum, for this would ignore the very
tangible solutions offered by the Statelessness Conventions which, where
ratified, provide solutions for the vast majority of stateless persons. 15 We
13. U.N. Economic and Social Council, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting, 5, E/AC.32/SR.4 (Jan. 26, 1950) [hereinafter
Record of the Fourth Meeting]. This decision was made early in the 1950 Ad Hoc Committee
round of meetings and officially declared in an annex to the Final Act of the 1951 Conference of
Plenipotentiaries round of meetings. See U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refuges and Stateless Persons, FinalAct and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 138
U.N.T.S. 1954 (July 25, 1961).

14. 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, arts. 26, 31, June 6, 1960,
360 U.N.T.S. 117; 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Dec. 13, 1975, 989
U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter jointly referred to as the Statelessness Conventions].
15. Some speak in these circumstances of the "link" between citizen and state, and others
speak of an "effective link". See RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (1983); Carol Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving

Nationality Status, 10 INT'L J. REFUGEE LAW 156, 156-68 (1998); 1954 Convention, supra note
14; Jane McAdam, 'DisappearingStates, Statelessness andthe Boundariesof InternationalLaw,
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Jane McAdam, ed.

2010). The concept of an "effective link" between state and individual for the purposes of
nationality was first articulated by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case.
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.) [1955] I.C.J. 1. An effective link may frequently be established

through presence in the territory of a state at birth either jus soli orjus sanguinis, or via residence
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are instead arguing that "unable to return" has a more stringent meaning
than it does on the standard construal and that, for stateless persons, this
genuine "inability to return" to any country of former habitual residence
gives rise to refugee status on its own, even in the absence of persecution.
Inability to return may be due to persecution or it may be due to other
factors, such as the destruction of one's state because of climate change.
Some scholars and jurists argue for a strongly teleological approach,
whereby the subsequent practice of the parties modifies a treaty.' 6 For
this reason, in Part IV we review current state practice. We will show that
our interpretation is only in superficial conflict with current state practice
because it is an open question whether cases that would qualify for
refugee status under our interpretation, but not under the standard
interpretation, have yet come before the law. If the proper construal of
the term of art "unable to return" is sufficiently stringent, many
unpersecuted displaced stateless persons will not meet it. In this case our
interpretation prescribes a concurring opinion with those courts who deny
refugee status to such claimants and we differ only in that our concurring
opinion is based on claimants not meeting our more stringent standard of
inability to return, rather than on their not being persecuted. But as we
will see, none of the courts have ruled against our rationale for a
concurring opinion and this means that there is nothing dispositive in the
case law to rule against our interpretation. Far from there being consensus
in the way the clause following the semicolon is applied, we will argue
the question we raise has not yet been directly addressed by municipal
courts.
But this will raise a further question. If in fact our interpretation
affords agreement over cases with the standard interpretation, then what
is its practical upshot? In Part V, we argue that though the difference
between our interpretation and the standard interpretation has been
academic so far, this may soon change. Though it will hopefully never
come to pass, environmental scientists predict that owing to a global rise
in sea levels and a warming climate, some small island states may become
uninhabitable in the next century. 17 We will argue that those who are
over a set period oftime in cases of naturalization. The statelessness of persons having an effective
link to a certain country but not persecuted by that country is usually caused either by a conflict
of nationality laws or a poorly drafted nationality law. The aim of the Statelessness Conventions
can be described as the aim of providing a framework in which to assist stateless persons with an
effective link to some country to obtain legal recognition of that link. However, since the
terminology of "link" or "effective" link does not show up in the text of these Conventions, we
shall not make explicit appeal to it in the text of this Article.
16. See Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special
Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic
Conference, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 318, 323-25 (1969); SHAw, supra note 11, at 841.

17. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Managing the Risks of
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: Special Report of the
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displaced, because their island nations are uninhabitable, will count as
lacking a nationality and unable to return to their countries of former
habitual residence in the sense of l(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. This
is a limited result: for example, it does not show that those whose islands
are damaged but not uninhabitable will count as refugees and it does not
show that other sorts of environmental migrants will count as refugees.
But the result is nevertheless significant, since the Statelessness
Conventions are not suitable instruments to assist this very vulnerable
group and the standard interpretation of l(A)(2) is so widely accepted
that the debate over whether displaced islanders of submerged states
might count as refugees has generally become a debate about whether
climate change is persecution. 18
If our arguments are successful, we will have shown that displaced
islanders of fully uninhabitable states count as refugees even though
climate change cannot be regarded as persecution. There will be no need
for additional regional or bilateral agreements to protect this particular
class of vulnerable people; they will automatically qualify for
international protection under existing law. This case will serve as an
illustration of the way that, on our interpretation, the definition of a
refugee in the 1951 Convention complements the definition of a stateless
person in the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions, yielding a more
cohesive international framework for protecting the unprotected.
II. THE ORDINARY MEANING OF l(A)(2)

The relevant portion of article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention as it
was brought into force in 1951 reads:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 'refugee' shall
apply to any person who...
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular political group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 18 (2012) (predicting increased sea level rise,
erosion, agricultural decimation, salinization of water supplies and tropical storms which threaten
the habitability of small islands).
18. McAdam, supra note 5, at 12-13.
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to return to it. 19

The elements "[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951"
and "as a result of such events" were removed by the 1967 Protocol, but
the passage remains otherwise intact in its contemporary form.2" The
article is divided into two clauses separated by a semicolon. The first
clause applies to persons with
a nationality and the second applies to
2
persons without a nationality. '
Well-founded fear of persecution is mentioned three times in l(A)(2).
However, only the first of these could potentially modify "unable... to
return" in the clause following the semicolon. 22 The second and third
occurrences are clearly intended only to modify "unwilling." There is no
ambiguity on this score in the structure of the phrase: "is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling . . ."23 The question before us is therefore

whether the phrase "owing to a well-founded fear" at the beginning of
l(A)(2) modifies everything that comes after it, or only the clause before
the semicolon.
If "owing to a well-founded fear" modifies everything after the
semicolon, this must either be because it directly modifies "unable to
return" or because it modifies "being outside the country of his former
habitual residence." But the former interpretation is clearly unsound.
"Unable" is twice contrasted in 1(A)(2) with "unwilling" in a way that
24
shows that these two terms must be understood to differ in meaning.
But what some refer to as psychological inability must be a form of
unwillingness, rather than a form of inability. 25 For an inability to be
"owing to fear" is for that inability to be a psychological inability.
"Unable," if it is to contrast with "unwilling," must mean some more
tangible form of inability, for example the existence of some kind of legal
prohibition, or perhaps an insurmountable physical obstacle, to returning,
but such tangible inabilities cannot be owed to fears, however wellfounded these fears may be.
This shows that if the "fear" clause is to be a requirement for all
displaced stateless persons who are unable to return, it cannot be because
the "fear" clause requires that the inability to return be owing to a
19. 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. l (A)(2).
20. Id.; 1967 Protocol, supra note 3, art. 1(2).
21. 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(2).
22. Id.
23. Id.; cf Ministerfor Immigration& MulticulturalAffairs v Savvin (& statement by Katz
J.as of 26 Apr. 2000) (2000), 98 F.C.R. 168, 7 (Austl.).
24. "Unable" is differentiated from "unwilling" by the word "or." 1951 Convention, supra
note 3, art. I (A)(2). According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, "or" is "used as a function
word to indicate an alternative." MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 64 (11 th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
MERRIAM-WEBSTER].

25.

Handbook on Procedures, supra note 4, at 37-39.
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forward-looking fear. Instead, it must be because that clause requires that
displaced stateless persons who are unable to return, had such fear when
they were originally displaced: "owing to a well-founded fear" must
modify "being outside the country of his former habitual residence." 26 It
is to the cogency of this reading that we now turn. In the remainder of
this part we offer a sustained textualist argument against this reading of
the 1951 Convention.
There are four points of grammar and usage suggesting that the
relevant passage of 1(A)(2) should not be read so that "owing to a wellfounded fear" modifies "being outside the country of his former habitual
residence." 27 We discuss these points in increasing order of decisiveness.
The first point is that if the drafters wished the passage to be so
construed, they should have used a comma rather than a semicolon.
Setting off a new clause with a semicolon signals its independence from
the preceding clause, whereas a comma signals a greater degree of
connection or subordination. 28 Importantly, the semi-colon in the middle
of 1(A)(2) would be the only breach of this rule in the Convention. The
only other use of semi-colons in article 1 of the 1951 Convention, and
indeed anywhere in the text of the 1951 Convention, is to set off
independent paragraphs, for example, to separate those who classify for
refugee status for the reasons given in I(A)(1) from those who classify
under 1(A)(2).29
But this is the weakest of the four points we shall consider. Though a
comma would have signaled a greater connection between the clauses
following it and the clauses preceding it, it would not have guaranteed
26. Id. Hathaway has argued that the assessment of a claimant's fear of returning to a
country to which she could not be sent back would be "a nonsensical exercise." JAMES
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 62 (1991). Curiously, Hathaway takes this to show

that such claimants cannot be refugees, which is to say that the passage of l(A)(2) following the
semi-colon is itself "non-sensical" because it necessarily cannot apply to anyone. Id Hathaway's
reasoning is further complicated by his claim, rejected by others that a country only counts as a
country of former habitual residence if one is still legally able to return there. E.g., Goodwin-Gill
& McAdam, supra note 11, at 68 n.89. In the most recent version of his book, JAMES HATHAWAY
& MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, 69 n.321 (2014), Hathaway and Foster
acknowledge that Hathaway's earlier argument on this point is "incorrect" and has not been
followed by municipal courts.
27. 1951 Convention, supra note 3.
28. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a semicolon "separates items in a
series."
29. This addresses the reasoning of Judge Katz in Ministerfor Immigration & Multicultural
Affairs v Savvin (& statement by Katz J. as of 26 Apr. 2000) (2000), 98 F.C.R. 168,
75-86

(Austl.). Judge Katz argues that semicolons do not always signal full independence of clauses.
We agree: our point is that the context of 1(A) as a whole shows that semicolons were being used
to signal such independence there. Note that the other two judges in the Savvin appeal, Judges
Spender and Drummond, both hold that the semicolon tells in favor of our construal of the plain
meaning. Id.
3-8, 24.
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that connection and it would have made the passage more difficult to
parse since it already contained a profusion of commas. Some
commentators have remarked that a semicolon alone is too small of a
discrepancy to decide such a large issue, 30 and we are inclined to agree.
A comma would have been clearer than a semicolon were "owing to a
well-founded fear" intended to modify "being outside the country of his
former habitual residence," but not decisively so.
The second point is that there is no verb tense agreement between the
clause for those who have a nationality and the clause for those who lack
one. Were there such agreement, the clause would have read as follows;
"any person who, owing to a well-founded fear..., is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable ... ; or who has no nationality and is
outside the country of his former habitual residence and is unable. .."
Instead, however, the text is worded as follows; "any person who...
owing to a well-founded fear.., is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable... ; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence,. . . is unable..."31
The way the text is actually worded, the two clauses do not agree in
tense: the clause preceding the semicolon uses the indicative ("is
outside"), but the clause following the semicolon uses the gerundive ("not
having a nationality," "being outside"), though the indicative ("has no
nationality," "is outside") could have been used without any sacrifice of
clarity. If the clause for those inside their country of former habitual
residence was meant to mirror and be modified by the same restriction as
the clause for those outside their country of nationality, this change in
verb tense would be very misleading, and would serve no clear purpose.
On the other hand if the clause following the semicolon was meant to be
autonomous from the clause preceding it, then the change in verb tense
would be a helpful signpost to this fact.
The third point is that if the drafters had wished the passage to be so
construed then they should not have used the phrase "or who"
immediately after the semicolon. 32 The initial "who" of 1(A) is meant to
set off a list of independent types ofpersons who are to qualify for refugee
status under the 1951 Convention. The first item, I(A)1, following this
"who," covers those who are to count because they had been considered
to be refugees under one of several earlier agreements, including some
that do not require persecution. 33 Accordingly the "or who" immediately
following the semicolon of l(A)(2) very strongly suggests that another
independent category of persons qualifying for refugee status is about to
be described (and one for whom it is not a given that persecution is
30. Id. 24 (opinion of Drummond, J.).
31. 1951 Convention, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id.art. I(A)(1).
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required, since it was not required in I(A)1). If this were not the drafters'
intent, they should not have written "or who" here, but should simply
have written "or" instead.
The fourth, and most compelling, point is that if the drafters had
wished the passage to be so construed then they should have written
"owing to a well-founded fear" again, just after "being outside the
country of his former habitual residence." 34 This is the most compelling
point, for the extra addition here would surely have been the easiest and
most direct way to prevent ambiguity. For example they might have
written the text as follows:
any person who, as a result of events occurring before 1 January
1950 and owing to a well-founded fear.., is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable . . . ; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence, as a result of such events and owing to such fears, is
unable...
Could the failure to do so have simply been an ordinary oversight?
Though this takes us away from a purely textualist analysis, it is worth
noting (and it is a point to which we shall return in Part III below) that
further inquiry into the drafting process shows that the omission here
almost certainly was not an ordinary oversight. In fact, the travaux show
that the drafters were well aware of the potential for ambiguity at
precisely this point in Article 1(A)(2). 35 The question arose during the
thirty-fourth meeting of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries. The drafters
noted the "anomaly" that it was ambiguous whether the temporal
restriction of eligibility for the 1951 Convention (to those whose plight
was "a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951.") extended to
the clause following the semicolon. 36 The drafters put the matter to a vote
and purposely opted to insert the phrase "as a result of such events" in the
clause following the semicolon on precisely the grounds that it might
otherwise be ambiguous whether this phrase modifies "being outside the
country of his former habitual residence."37 The report from the
conference reads as follows:

34. Id.
35. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refuges and Stateless Persons,
Summary Record of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting, U.N. Doc A/CONF.2/SR.34 (2)(i) (Nov. 30,
1951) [hereinafter Record of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting]. See also GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM,
supra note 11, at 68-70.
36. Record of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting, supra note 35 (comment by Mr. Hoare).
37. 1951 Convention, supra note 3; Record of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting, supra note 35,

(2)(i).
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Mr. HOARE (United Kingdom) drew attention to the anomaly,
which was really a drafting point, in subparagraph (2) of paragraph
A resulting from the omission of a reference to events occurring
before 1 January 1951 from the last phrase of the paragraph, which
dealt with the person who had no nationality and was outside the
country of his former habitual residence. He could not imagine that
those who had drafted the compromise text in question had
intended to make any difference between persons having a
nationality and stateless persons. He therefore proposed that the
words 'as a result of such events' should be inserted after the word
'residence' in the penultimate line of subparagraph (2) of
paragraph A.3 8

Accordingly, the final 1951 version of the text of l(A)(2) reads:
any person who . . . as a result of events occurring before 1
January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear..., is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable ... ; or who not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such
39
fear, is unwilling to return to it.

To some commentators, the above quote and the subsequently adopted
formulation of the text is evidence that the drafters wished to treat
stateless refugee claimants and those with a nationality exactly the
same. 40 We disagree. It is clear from reading the Summary Record of the
Thirty-Fourth meeting in its entirety that the drafters wished to treat those
with a nationality and those lacking a nationality the same way
concerning the temporal restriction added to the original Art. 1(A)(2).
This was the narrow topic under consideration in this part of the meeting.
But the phrases "as a result of [such] events" and "owing to wellfounded fear" occur as conjuncts of the very same conjunctive clause in
the first part of 1(A)(2). It would be preposterous to accuse the drafters
of observing that the "A" of "A and B" required repeating, but failing to
note that the "B" therefore did as well, though the grammatical positions
of "A" and "B" were in all other respects the same. We must therefore
understand the decision not to reiterate the well-founded fear clause after
reiterating the temporal restriction clause to be deliberate, rather than a
careless oversight. The above quote is in fact evidence that the drafters
meant to treat the two kinds of refugee differently: the requirement of
38. Record of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting, supra note 35, (2)(i).
39. 1951 Convention, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
40. See Revenko v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500,
62, 67 (U.K.); GOODWIN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 11, at 68-70 n.92.
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well-founded fear of persecution was only needed to evaluate the refugee
claims of those who had a nationality, or those who were able but
unwilling to return to their country of former habitual residence. Of
course, the quote is not relevant to the evaluation of the plain meaning.
The point about plain meaning is simply that after the semicolon, the text
repeats "A" of "A and B"
but not "B" and we know that the authors of
41
the text understood this.
This concludes our textual analysis of the grammar and usage of
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention. We conclude that on a textualist
interpretation there is no restriction to a well-founded fear of persecution
for those who lack a nationality, are outside their country of former
habitual residence, and are unable to return to it. But as we have noted,
most of the focus in the literature and commentary has been on the
broader purposes of the 1951 Convention rather than its plain meaning.
For this reason, we turn now to an examination of the broader purposes
of the 1951 Convention. We will defend our own construal of these and
argue that according to our construal, the text of the 1951 Convention and
its broader purposes are in harmony. The broader purposes of the 1951
Convention do not call for any restriction to a well-founded fear for
stateless persons who are unable to return to their country of former
habitual residence, though they do call for a stringent understanding of
"unable to return. 42
III. THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF l(A)(2)
A. The StandardInterpretation
The standard interpretation of the 1951 Convention is that it was
intended to cover only persecuted persons.43 We hold that this
interpretation is inadequate. We have already argued that the text of
1(A)(2) does not happily accommodate this standard interpretation. Now
we shall argue that this reading also does not cohere with the object and

41. See Revenko v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500,
8993 (U.K.). Mr. Nichol advanced an argument along the present lines, and it appears to have
impressed Lord Justice Clarke.
42. Our aim here shall be to establish that our interpretation is preferable on all standard
interpretive strategies: textualist, broader purposes and subjectivist, and teleological. See supra
note 9 on treaty interpretation.
43. In particular, those who have left their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear
of persecution on the basis of one of five enumerated Convention grounds: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. 1951 Convention, supra
note 3, art. l(A)(2).
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purpose of the 1951 Convention. 44 Nor does this interpretation do justice
to the way in which (as we shall see) the 1951 Convention was intended
to be complementary to the Statelessness Conventions, and so to mesh
with the international protection framework as a whole.
Why is the standard interpretation so popular if, as we are about to
argue, it is inadequate in these ways? Here, we will quickly canvas three
reasons before going on to outline our own construal of the broader
purposes of the 1951 Convention. A general theme in what follows will
be that it was a difficult matter to create a single definition of a refugee
that was both enforceable and simple to understand and that also stayed
true to the broader considerations which guided the creation of the 1951
Convention.
One reason for the popularity of the standard interpretation is the
prevalent mention of persecution in the drafting documents and in the text
of the 1951 Convention, though it should be noted that persecution was
not a determining factor in earlier refugee documents. 45 In some, but not
all, drafts of the 1951 Convention submitted by states it is suggested that
persecuted persons should be the priority, and there are statements made
by various representatives to the drafting meetings emphasizing how
crucial it is that the 1951 Convention offer protection for persecuted
persons. 46 However, we will show below that this was not the
unequivocal focus of the drafting process or of the resulting 1951
Convention. Though the specter of persecutory regimes like the National
Socialist German Worker's Party state obviously loomed over the
drafters, their deeper concern was with the kind of fundamental
deprivation of rights that this sort of persecution brought on, not with
persecution as the primary evil itself.
A second reason for the popularity of the standard interpretation is
that not all stateless persons are covered by the 1951 Convention and, in
47
particular, most un-persecuted stateless persons are not covered by it.
Resolving statelessness is the purpose of the Statelessness Conventions
44. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 9, art. 31(1) (discussing the
role of object and purpose in treaty interpretation).
45. For earlier documents that make provisions for unpersecuted persons, see, e.g., U.N.
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, annex 1, 1(a), Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat.
3037, 18 U.N.T.S. 3; Arrangement of May 12, 1926 relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates
to Russian and Armenian Refugees,
2, 89 L.N.T.S. 2004 (1926); 1938 League of Nations
Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, art. I, 192 L.N.T.S. 4461
(1938).
46. See U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, France:Proposal
for a Draft Convention Preamble, art. I, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L.3 (Jan. 17, 1950) [hereinafter
France Proposal].
47. "Mr. Henkin (United States of America) said that in the view of his Government the
convention should apply only to refugees.., and not to stateless persons who were not refugees."
Record of the Fourth Meeting, supra note 13, 5.
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and these have a sphere of application distinct from that of the 1951
Convention.48 In fact, the three documents are in many ways
complementary to one another. It cannot therefore be that all stateless
persons qualify for refugee status simply by virtue of being outside their
country of former habitual residence. States will frequently deny
repatriation to non-national former residents because, for example, the
person lacks documentation. If a state denies return to a former resident
because of an expired residency visa, is not that resident therefore "unable
to return"?
The standard interpretation offers an accounting for this that many
have accepted: such a resident would be "unable to return" and this is
why there must have been some additional restriction on the "unable to
return" clause in 1(A)(2). According to this reasoning, if we do not read
an additional limitation into the "unable to return" clause of l(A)(2),
many stateless persons who apply for assistance under the 1951
Convention would automatically qualify for it upon leaving their
countries of former habitual residence, assuming they would have a
difficult time gaining permission to re-enter. This is a reason that some
have cited for favoring the standard interpretation: it is difficult to see
how else to construe l(A)(2) in light of the parties' clear wish not to
include all stateless persons as refugees. Below, we will show how our
own reading undercuts this motivation for the standard interpretation.
A third consideration in support of the standard interpretation is the
drafters' decision to limit the refugee definition to the period of the
Second World War.49 The subsequent lifting of the temporal restriction
by the 1967 Protocol transformed the 1951 Convention into a law of
universal applicability, but almost all of the original language of the 1951
Convention remained. This has made it challenging to parse the meaning
of article l(A)(2), as it was not originally intended to be universally
applicable at the time of its drafting. But we will make clear below that
the drafters' original restrictions of when and where do not entail any
persecutory restriction on how.
We will present considerations which undercut each and every one of
these defenses of the standard interpretation. In so doing, we aim to
uncover a more nuanced and comprehensive interpretation of Article
48. See generally Statelessness Conventions, supra note 14. See also U.N. Ad Hoc
Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, A Study of Statelessness, United Nations, August
1949, Lake Success - New York, 58-60, U.N. Doc. E/1112; E/1112/Add.l (Aug. 1, 1949)
(discussing the need for a separate convention for non-refugee stateless persons) [hereinafter
Study of Statelessness].
49. U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, United States of
America: Memorandum on the Definition Article of the PreliminaryDraft Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (and Stateless Persons) (E/AC.32), U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L.4 (Jan. 18,
1950) [hereinafter United States Memorandum]. This restriction was removed by the 1967
Protocol, supra note 3.
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l(A)(2).
B. The Object and Purposeof the 1951 Convention
Here we take a closer look at the purpose of the 1951 Convention as
evidenced by the document as a whole including its preamble. The
preamble states that the United Nations wishes to protect refugees'
"fundamental rights and freedoms."50 The preamble also describes the
purpose of refugee status, which is "social and humanitarian." 51 From
these two statements, we may infer that the purpose of the 1951
Convention is to ensure refugee welfare by protecting their fundamental
rights and freedoms.
To accomplish this purpose, the 1951 Convention is to "revise and
consolidate" previous conventions and "extend" their scope. 52 From this
we may infer that the 1951 Convention was intended to expand, rather
than restrict, refugee status from what it had been in the past.
With this in mind, we turn to the text of the 1951 Convention itself
One word repeated multiple times within the text of the 1951 Convention
itself is "protection., 53 The 1951 Convention enumerates the many
fundamental rights and freedoms that make up this "protection."
The moral that we glean from this, what we learn about the object and
purpose of 1(A)(2) from a broader consideration of the 1951 Convention
and its Preamble, is that the purpose of the passage was expansive rather
than restrictive, and concerned with restoring protection in the form of
fundamental rights and freedoms to those who lack them on grounds that
might be considered to be a social or humanitarian concern.
This focus on fundamental rights, and social or humanitarian
concerns suggests that we should read "unable to return" restrictively: we
should take it as a kind of inability that is fundamental, and of social or
humanitarian concern, rather than simply a problem of paperwork or
other comparatively superficial matters. But it equally suggests that the
purpose of the passage was to be inclusive concerning all persons whose
lack of protection truly was fundamental and of social or humanitarian
concern. The underlying purpose of the 1951 Convention, these passages
suggest, is to supply international protection to those who have
irreparably lost protection in their country of origin by restoring to them
their fundamental rights and freedoms in the form of asylum.5 4 This claim
50. 1951 Convention, supra note 3, pmbl. See also UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH
CENTRE FOR INT'L LAW, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951, at 16 (Julian Weis ed., 1995).
51. 1951 Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. It is widely acknowledged that supplying international protection was the purpose of
the Refugee Convention. That the concept of loss of national protection and the concept of
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is further supported by a look at the language of the 1967 Protocol, whose
principal purpose was to remove restrictions of place, time and55 cause on
who should qualify for assistance under the 1951 Convention.
But what of persecution? Reference to persecution appears in the
definition of refugee status in l(A)(2), in the definition of cessation in
Article 1(C)(4)-(6) and, obliquely, in the non-refoulement clause in
Article 33.56 In the Preamble, reference is made to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, though not specifically to Article 14.
Rather, the Preamble refers to fundamental rights and freedoms more
generally. Persecution is not mentioned in the Preamble. A reading of the
1951 Convention and its Preamble certainly shows that persecution is an
important factor in determining if someone is a refugee. What is not
obvious is that addressing persecution per se was the purpose of the 1951
Convention.
Our considered view is that the focus on protection in the 1951
Convention and the Preamble settles the question of broader purpose: the
broader purpose of the 1951 Convention is to offer international
protection to those who have irreparably lost national protection by
restoring to them their fundamental rights and freedoms in the form of
asylum. Nevertheless, though many scholars mention protection of
fundamental rights and freedoms as a purpose of the 1951 Convention, 57
there is disagreement on the matter. 58 In light of this disagreement, we
turn now to an analysis of the drafting history and historical context to
offer further support for our interpretation of 1(A)(2).
persecution are so frequently used interchangeably by scholars and refugee lawyers does not mean
that the two concepts do not come apart, nor does it mean that "lack of protection" must, by
default, require persecution. See Walter Klin, Non-State Agents of Persecutionand the Inability
of States to Protect, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 415, 417 (2001). Kdlin acknowledges that the purpose
of the Convention is commonly thought of as "an instrument protecting persons whose
relationship of trust with the State of origin no longer exists." Id. See also Antonio Fortin, The
Meaningof 'Protection'inthe Refugee Definition, 12 INT'L J.REFUGEE L. 548, 548 (2000) (stating
that "lack of national protection is one of the constituent elements of the refugee definition").
55. 1967 Protocol, supra note 3.
56. Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention articulates the principle of nonrefoulement, or non-expulsion, so that no refugee should be expelled "to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom may be threatened on account..." of one of the enumerated grounds.
It has long been established, however, that the principle of non-refoulement applies to asylumseekers, torture victims and others who may not qualify for refugee status. The non-refoulement
clause in the 1951 Refugee Convention therefore is not a limiting factor on who qualifies as a
refugee. Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principleof
Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

116 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2001).
57. For example, Kalin & Fortin, supra note 53.
58. See, e.g., Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpretingthe Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV.
733, 770, 774 (1998). Steinbock identifies three possible purposes of the Refugee Convention,
one of which is "protection of persons facing human rights violations." Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol26/iss3/4

18

Alexander and Simon: "Unable to Return" in the 1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refu

2014]

"UNABLE TO RETURN" IN THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION: STATELESS REFUGEES

549

C. The Subjective Approach and the DraftingHistory
While the Preamble does not reference persecution, focusing instead
on protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, reference to
persecution appears in 1(A)(2) as a key part of the definition of a refugee.
Persecution is obviously an important criterion in the characterization of
refugee status. Our view is that this is because persecution is typical of
irreparable loss of national protection, but not essential to it, in roughly
the way that smoking is a typical cause of lung cancer, though not
essential to it. So too we claim that, though most refugees so far have
been persecuted, in principle not all refugees must be persecuted. But as
we shall see, the typicality of persecution as the cause of irreparable loss
of protection explains the prevalence of its mention in the 1951
Convention and its drafting documents.
We will now begin our substantive analysis of the drafting history and
historical context of 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. 59 We will organize
this argument chronologically into three subsections. The first of these,
Part III.D, will discuss refugee agreements antecedent to the 1951
Convention. We will see that in these antecedents, such as the IRO
Constitution, persecution is not the exclusive concern even in cases where
a distinction between refugees and stateless persons is drawn.
In the next part, Part III.E, we will examine the travaux of the
preliminary round of meetings of states' representatives on the drafting
of the 1951 Convention: the Ad Hoc Committee on the Reduction of
Statelessness and Related Problems. Here we will see that, when the
states' representatives reached the decision not to cover all stateless
persons under the 1951 Convention they were to draft, their aim was not
to focus on persecution per se, but rather to find a way to offer protection
for those whose loss of national protection was truly fundamental and
irreparable. The desire was to draw a distinction between those persons
eligible for a rehabilitation of national protection under what would
become the Statelessness Conventions, and those persons requiring
international protection under the 1951 Convention. As we shall argue in
59. We reiterate, concerning treaty interpretation, that our aim is to show that our
interpretation of the 1951 Convention satisfies all of the usual methods of treaty interpretation,
including a strict textualist approach, a subjective approach focusing on the drafting history, as
well as the commonly applied teleological approach. For this reason, it is unnecessary to argue
the relative merits of one approach over another. Our interpretation is justified by all of the
commonly accepted methods proscribed by the Vienna Convention as well as more modem
approaches. For discussion of these distinct principles of international treaty interpretation, see
Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation:With Special Reference to the
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 318 (1969) (for discussion of these distinct principles of international treaty
interpretation). For a discussion of the methods applied to the 1951 Convention, see GOODWINGILL & McADAM, supra note 11.
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Part III.E, the intention of the drafters at this stage was that there should
be a complementarity between these conventions: those who could not be
assisted by the 1951 Convention were
to be the provision of the to-be60
drafted Statelessness Conventions.
Then in Part III.F, we will focus on the actual moment at which the
language of the clause following the semicolon was introduced in its final
form to the draft document, with specific attention to the addition of
"unable to return." What is striking here, as we shall see below, is that
the introduction of this language into the clause of I(A)(2) following the
semicolon was one of the very few changes that the General Assembly of
the United Nations (UNGA) itself made to the draft after the conclusion
of the Ad Hoc Committee and before approving it for a final round of
review by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries (who for their part left the
phrase unaltered, except for the reintroduction of the temporal restriction
which is a further point in favor of our interpretation). The only clear way
to understand this change by the UNGA is that it was meant to remove'a
restriction to persecution, since as we shall see below, such a restriction
is clear in the version of the text that the UNGA modified.
This will conclude our review of the history and context of the drafting
of the 1951 Convention. After this, in Part IV, we will examine state
practice in the years following the adoption of the 1951 Convention. As
the International Court of Justice has never been asked to interpret
1(A)(2) or any other article of the 1951 Convention, we must rely on state
practice as evidenced by municipal court decisions. 6 1 In particular, we
will look at the sparse case history that provides the only examples of
interpretation of the clause following the semicolon in 1(A)(2). We will
argue that the issue in dispute between our interpretation and the standard
interpretation has never been properly before the courts. For a court ruling
to tell against our interpretation, that court would have to offer up a
construal of our more stringent reading of "unable to return," grant that a
claimant was unable even in this more stringent sense, and argue that
nevertheless that claimant does not merit refugee status. But this has yet
60. The drafting history of the Statelessness Conventions were deeply intertwined with that
of the 1951 Convention. The 1954 Statelessness Convention began life as a draft protocol to the
1951 Convention. It was determined by the UNGA that further work was required before
ratification, but as we shall see below, the document was originally intended as an extension of
the 1951 Convention to those stateless persons in need of assistance but not covered by its
provisions. See, e.g., Record of the Fourth Meeting, supra note 13, 30; UNHCR Ad Hoc
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Statelessness Conference, Jan. 26, 1950, First
Session: Summary Record of the Third Meeting Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday,
17 Jan. 1950, 3 p.m., 15 [hereinafter Record of Third Meeting].
61. Bruno Simma, Miscellaneous Thoughts on Subsequent Agreement and Practice, in
TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 46, 49 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013) (stating that "[Courts] apply

such [fixed] meaning of a treaty provision to its environment"
"evolutionary/dynamic interpretation").
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to happen. It is consistent with our interpretation that "unable to return"
gets a very stringent reading indeed, one that excludes many who have
claimed refugee status under the "inability" clause so far.
D. DisplacedPersons andRefugees Before the 1951 Convention
The purpose of offering international protection to those who had lost
national protection is common to all of the refugee definitions in the
period leading up to the drafting of the 1951 Convention. 62 A series of
refugee agreements under the auspices of the League of Nations in the
1920s and 1930s define refugees as those persons of a relevant social
group who lack the protection of their state or country of former habitual
residence, if stateless. 63 Persecution does not explicitly enter the
discussion of the definition of a refugee until the period of the Second
World War. 64 During this period, lack of protection tended to result from
persecution and we see a shift in focus from the condition, lack of
protection, to its cause, persecution, as refugee documents seek
to expand
65
provisions for persons fleeing persecution in fascist states.
The shift to a focus on cause appears to have been for purposes of
inclusion rather than exclusion: securing that anyone who truly needed
international protection could access it. Notably, the most important
international refugee document of this period, the IRO Constitution, also
includes provisions for displaced persons who cannot be repatriated,
whether or not their displacement was brought on or sustained by
persecution. 66 Equally notably, the U.S. working draft submitted to the
Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems was drawn
directly from the IRO Constitution and included a provision for displaced

62. See Kilin & Fortin, supra note 53.
63. Some of these documents require the formal statelessness of claimants while others do
not. See Arrangement of 12 May 1926 and Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming
from Germany, supra note 44. See also James C. Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in
InternationalLaw: 1920-1950,33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 348 (1984); Gilbert Jaeger, On the History
of the InternationalProtectionofRefugees, 83 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 727, 727 (2001).
64. While protection from political and religious persecution had been part of the common
conception of asylum before the Second World War, persecution was not explicitly part of the
legal definition in earlier refugee instruments. See Jane McAdam, Rethinking the Origins of
'Persecution' in Refugee Law, 25 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 667, 679 (2014). See also James C.
Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J.
129, 149-50 (1990).
65. Hathaway, supra note 62.
66. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, supra note 44. See also Kalin,
supra note 23, at 420. Kalin also notes that the IRO Constitution distinguishes between the factors
causing flight and the purpose of the IRO: restoring protection. Id. See also Louis W. HOLBORN,
THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION, A SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
ITS HISTORY AND WORK 1946-1952, at 339-46 (1956).
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67
persons with no requirement of persecution.

E. The Draftingof the 1951 Convention
The focus in the drafting history of the 1951 Convention was not
exclusively centered on persecution. Persecution was one important
component of those discussions but it was not their exclusive focal point.
For example, early in the preliminary round of drafting meetings, in 1950,
the French delegation proposed a draft convention which would have
explicitly centered the 1951 Convention on the right to asylum from
persecution in Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 68 But in fact, that same French draft proposal also includes a
separate clause covering all persons unable to obtain permission to return
to their countries of origin.6 Though the draft was eventually rejected, it
was not because of the inclusion of this latter clause. 70 The draft that the
Ad Hoc Committee determined to work from was the preliminary U.S.
draft, 7 ' which was based on the IRO Constitution.72 Like the IRO
Constitution, it includes provisions for displaced persons who had been
deported for forced labor
and could not be repatriated, whether they had
73
been persecuted or not.
The travaux of the Ad Hoc Committee show that the drafters
understood their initial task to be determining whether all persons who
lack state protection should be covered under the new 1951 Convention,
or only some of them. 74 The question was not which protections were at
issue. The drafters appear to have been unconflicted on this score: the
protections they understood to be under the purview of international law
were diplomatic and consular protections, stemming from the right of a
state to protect its citizens while abroad; protections that included the
67. United States Memorandum, supra note 48.
68. France Proposal, supra note 45.
69. Id.
70. Id. This draft was rejected because the drafters worried that the persecution clause was
too inclusive and difficult to enforce. It was decided instead to enumerate grounds of possible
causes of persecution. One might object that, in light of the exclusionary intent of the enumeration
of grounds, it is unlikely that the "unable to return" clause would have been intended in as
inclusive of a spirit as we suggest. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems,
First Session: Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting Held at Lake Success, New York, on
Wednesday, Jan. 18, 1950, 2:15 PM, 8. But as we see in the French Proposal, this clause has a
different genealogy from the clauses in the passage preceding the semicolon of article I (A)(2).
Also, the aims of the enumeration of grounds were specificity rather than exclusivity, except
perhaps in the sense that they may have meant to exclude those whose lack of protection was
repairable rather than irreparable. Id.
71. United States Memorandum, supra note 48.
72. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, supra note 44.
73. United States Memorandum, supra note 48.
74. Record of Third Meeting, supra note 59,
2-3.
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right of repatriation, that is, the right to return to one's country of
nationality. The question was whether a distinction should be drawn
regarding how protections are lacked: whether the lack of protection
should be sufficiently severe. Some participants wished to include all
"unprotected persons," arguing that the difference between refugees and
stateless persons was one of degree and not kind.76 Others wished to focus
only on "the humanitarian problem of the refugees," leaving the "legal
problem" of statelessness either to a protocol to the 1951 Convention or
to another document entirely. 77 This latter opinion prevailed. The
committee eventually agreed that their task should be to draft a document
targeted specifically at refugees (though they had not yet defined this
term), whether legally stateless or not, though they decided that this
document should have a protocol declaring that stateless persons should
receive the same treatment to the extent possible. The protocol would
eventually lead to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
78
Persons.
The Committee emphasized the difference between the "more
urgent," "more unfortunately placed," "humanitarian" 79 nature of the
problems of refugees, contrasted with the merely "legal" problems of
stateless persons. The drafters appear to have been influenced at this
75.

See Fortin,supra note 53, at 554; KAlin, supra note 53, at 417-48. See also PAUL WEIS,
(2d ed. 1979); UNHCR Expert
Meeting, May 27-28, 2010, The Concept of Stateless PersonsUnder InternationalLaw Summary
Conclusions, § II(A)(2) (Sept. 26, 2010). Grahl-Madsen argues that the drafters had (or anyway
should have had) a broader conception of relevant protections, because the basic point of refugee
status is the "breakdown" of the relationship between state and individual, and loss of diplomatic
or consular protection is only an effect of that breakdown. See GRAHL-MADSEN, supranote 1, at
97-99.
76. Record of the Fourth Meeting, supra note 13, 1 7. The U.K. draft proposal primarily
focuses on "unprotected persons" and would have included all stateless persons. UNHCR Ad Hoc
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Statelessness Conference, Jan. 17, 1950,
United Kingdom: Draft proposalfor Article 1, E/AC.32/2 (Jan. 1950) [hereinafter U.K. Draft].
See also U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, First Session: Summary
Record of the Second Meeting Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 17 Jan. 1930,
11 AM, 20 (remarks of the U.K. delegate, Sir Leslie Brass) [hereinafter Record of Second
Meeting].
77. Record of Second Meeting, supra note 75, 11 18 & 19 (Remarks of the U.S. delegate,
Mr. Henkin).
78. See Record of the Fourth Meeting, supra note 13. See also Record of Third Meeting,
supra note 59,
12-15 (This protocol was drafted but was not incorporated into the final draft.
Instead, another committee was convened on a separate occasion to finalize it, and this ended up
becoming the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons).
79. Record of Third Meeting, supra note 59, 11 11, 13, 34.
80. Record of the Second Meeting, supra note 75, T 19. It should be noted that for Henkin
and the drafters, the term "humanitarian" had a less technical meaning than it does today: it
included also what we now think of as "human rights" concerns. For a history of the relationship
between humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights law, see Jane McAdam, Humane Rights:
NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

23

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26

point by one of the texts that was designated as a guide for their work, the
1949 U.N. Study of Statelessness, which declares that the position of
stateless persons who are not refugees is "more favourable" than that of
stateless refugees because; "the stateless person who is not a refugee can
obtain documents establishing his civil status from the authorities of the
countries where these documents were originally issued, because these
authorities have no reason to refuse them to him." 8 ' Crucially, at this
pivotal stage the drafters did not appeal to the idea that the problems of
refugees must essentially be problems of a persecutory nature. Rather
they appealed to the more encompassing idea that the problems of
refugees were, in the language of the preamble of the 1951 Convention,
"social and humanitarian" in nature, rather than merely, as U.S.
Representative Henkin expresses it, "legal. 82 What guided the drafters'
thinking concerning who should be covered by the convention for
refugees (on which they had determined to focus) and who should be
covered by the convention for stateless persons who were not refugees
(which they had determined to begin then, but complete later) was not per
se the question of who was persecuted, but the question of who could not
83
be repatriated because they suffered from a fundamental "breakdown"84
that required surrogate international protection in the form of asylum.
Nevertheless, by the time of the conclusion of the sessions of the Ad
Hoc Committee, the drafters had provisionally settled on a formulation
that very clearly made persecution or fear thereof a requirement on any
refugee. Were this the final form that the 1951 Convention took, our
argument would be very different. Then the textualist argument would be
against us and the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention would be
less clear.
But even in that alternative, there would remain a reason for us to
think that the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention was not to focus
on persecution for its own sake. Persecution appears to have played the
role it did at this stage because persecution was then, and remains now, a
factor in the clearest cases of fundamental, irreparable lack of protection
on which the drafters had determined to focus. Generally speaking, if you
are not being persecuted, there are legal avenues to the rehabilitation of
your relationship with your country of origin, such as approaching your
embassy to obtain a replacement passport or register the birth of a child

The Refugee Convention as a Blueprint for Complementary Protection Status, in FORCED
MIGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY 7-11 (Jane McAdam ed., 2008).
81. Study of Statelessness, supra note 47, § IV.
82. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, First Session: Summary
Record of the Second Meeting, supra note 75, 19.
83. DONNER, supra note 15, at 44-96; Batchelor, supra note 15, at 156-58.
84. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 1, at 97.
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85

born abroad.
Since the 1951 Convention was intended to be an enforceable
document that would affect the lives of millions, it was deemed very
important that its criteria of classification were practically
implementable. This was in fact the subject of much debate during the
Ad Hoc Committee sessions and it was in response to this debate that the
drafters ultimately determined to enumerate grounds of well-founded
fear, despite some earlier drafts not doing so. 86 The concem was that a
document that was too open-ended would either not be ratified, or would
87
be subject to different standards of enforcement by different nations.
For this reason, even if the final draft of the 1951 Convention were
the version that the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the UNGA, via the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), for approval in August 1950,
we should not assume that redressing persecution was its sole object,
despite the fact that it would then only cover persecuted persons. Here is
the language of that draft, as submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee to the
UNGA:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term refugee shall apply
to any person ... (3) Who has had, or has, well-founded fear of
being the victim of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality or political opinion, as a result of events in Europe
before 1 January 1951, or circumstances directly resulting from
such events, and, owing to such fear, has had to leave, shall leave,
or remains outside the country of his nationality, before or after 1
January 1951, and is unable, or, owing to such fear or for reasons
other than personal convenience, unwilling, to avail himself of the
protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or,
if he has no nationality, has left, shall leave,
or remains outside the
88
country of his former habitual residence.
Even if the UNGA had accepted the language of this draft, which as
we will see in a moment it did not, in light of what we have seen of the
85. Recall that at this time, international protection was limited to redressing a lack of
consular and diplomatic protection abroad.
86. France Proposal, supra note 45; U.K. Draft, supra note 75.
87. Record of Second Meeting, supra note 75, 29. (Remarks of the Chairman on his
preference for a limited convention); UNHCR Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, Statelessness Conference, Jan. 26, 1950, FirstSession: Summary Records of the FirstTenth Meetings Held at Lake Success, New York (discussing the balance between a limited and
more extensive convention over multiple meetings).
88. Note that (2) admitted all those who were recognized by the IRO as falling under its
mandate, a group that, as we have noted, included displaced persons unable to return, whether
persecuted or no. So even here, the focus on persecution is not exclusive. ECOSOC Res. 319 (XI),
U.N. Economic and Social Council, E/RES/319 (XI) (Aug. 16, 1950).
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preliminary meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee as well as the earlier
documents on which they drew, it would still be reasonable to hold that
the object and purpose was to identify those who fundamentally and
irreparably lacked protection given that at the time of the drafting of the
1951 Convention these persons were, in the vast preponderance of cases,
persecuted persons. Read in the context of the Second World War and its
aftermath in Europe, it is obvious that persecution was at the forefront of
the drafters' minds as being the key cause of permanent displacement
during the war years. But the object and purpose is here still better
thought of as the aim of assisting anyone suffering from the relevant
condition, and not only those who have the condition for the usual
reasons.
But all of this is by way of a hypothetical, since the language of that
draft was not the language of the final version. As things actually turned
out, the UNGA did not accept the Ad Hoc Committee's suggested
formulation of the crucial definitional clause. Notably, the UNGA
accepted the wording of almost every other clause and article of the 1951
Convention. 89 The primary change that the UNGA made to the text was
to alter the structure of the clause following the semicolon in 1(A)(2)
from one that unambiguously restricted that clause to persons outside
their country due to a well-founded fear of persecution, to the final
version.

90

F. "Unable to Return"
We turn now to a review of the development of the language of
"unable to return" into its final form in l(A)(2). The phrase first appears
in a memorandum of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
(ICR), a predecessor to UNHCR. The ICR was the leading body for
refugee issues during and immediately following the war. 91 Created in
1938 as a result of the Evian Conference,9 2 its initial purpose was to assist
93
all persons who had to flee Greater Germany owing to persecution.
By 1943, the ICR's mandate had expanded and was understood to be
the protection of all persons who were outside their countries of origin
89. An examination of the two texts shows that the final version of the 1951 Convention
and the draft submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee were very similar. 1951 Convention, supra
note 3; ECOSOC Res., supranote 87.
90. 1951 Convention, supranote 3.
91. The ICR was responsible for assisting refugees, for example, by issuing travel
documents. See generally Intergovernmental Conference on the Adoption of a Travel Document
for Refugees, Oct. 15, 1946, 11 U.N.T.S. 150 (Oct. 1946).
92. See generally JOHN MENDELSOHN & DONALD DETWILER, JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM
1933 TO THE EVIAN CONFERENCE OF 1938 (2009).

93. Evian Conference on Jewish Refugees, July 6-13, 1938, Decisions Taken at the Evian
Conference on Jewish Refugees (Jilly 14, 1938).
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owing to persecution. 94 In a memorandum on the expansion of its
practical programme in 1946, the ICR recognized as a category
"displaced persons who are unwilling or unable '9to5 return to their
countries of nationality or former habitual residence."
James Hathaway, in The Evolution of Refugee Status in International
Law, suggests that the ICR's expansion of its practical programme was
in answer to the UNRRA's need for alternate solutions for those who
could not be repatriated.96 The U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation
Commission (UNRRA) was created to repatriate displaced persons
during and after the war. 97 In Resolution 10 of its mandate, the UNRRA
indicates its intention to engage in the "closest cooperation" with the ICR
(along with the International Red Cross), "with a view to invoking their
collaboration in the work of the repatriation of displaced persons." 98 By
the end of the war, there were people stranded outside of their former
countries for a host of complex reasons, many of whom could not be, or
did not wish to be, repatriated. 99
These facts support Hathaway's suggestion that the aim of the ICR's
expansion of program was inclusive in nature; designed to offer coverage
to this group of persons whose plight was not remedied by the sort of
assistance offered by the UNRRA. If Hathaway is correct, then the
language of "unable to return" at this stage was intended to extend
protection to a group that would not otherwise have been protected.'l0
94. For a good overview of the history of refugee protection in Europe prior to the creation
of the International Refugee Organization, including the mandate of the Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees, see UNHCR, "An Introduction to the International Protection of
Refugees (RLD I)," June 1992, at 3.
95. Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, Memorandum, Extension of Activities of
the Intergovernmental Committee, Doc ID IC/EX/75 (July 8, 1946).
96. James Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in InternationalLaw, 33 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 370, 372 (1984) (stating that "[tihe initial policy adopted by UNRRA was that
individuals unable for any reason to return to their countries of nationality or former habitual
residence should be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.").
97. The UNRRA was created in November 1943, inter alia to help repatriate displaced
persons. Id. at 372. The right to return was an important state protection guaranteed by
international law. WEIS, supra note 74, at 124.
98. U.N. Relief and Rehab. Admin. [UNRRA] Council, Resolutions on Policy of the First
Session of the Council, res. 10 (1943) [hereinafter UNRRA Resolutions].
99.

See Louis W. HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION, A SPECIALIZED

AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ITS HISTORY AND WORK 345-46 (1956) (discussion of
Romanian Repatriation mission's refusal to cooperate with the IRO).
100. There was a restriction of attention to cases of persecution in the mandate of the ICR.
The mandate of the UNRRA is a more complicated story. See UNRRA Resolutions, supra note
97, res. 10 (invoking such a restriction). But shortly thereafter, in Resolution 57, in an expansion
of its mandate to cover displaced persons in formerly enemy territories, it includes also displaced
persons who had been obliged to leave because of "activities in favor of the United Nations" or
who had been obliged to leave by the United Nations on grounds of health and sanitation. See id
res. 57.
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The language in the memorandum of the ICR does not reappear until
a later stage of the drafting of the 1951 Convention. Though at various
points in the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee, the first drafting
round of the 1951 Convention, the inclusion of "displaced persons" as a
category distinct from persecuted persons is considered, the only
appearance of "unable to return" in those proceedings is in the
preliminary French draft, which recommends that refugee status be
granted to all persons who seek asylum from persecution as per Article
14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, notably, also to
persons who are unable to obtain permission to return to their countries
of origin.' 0 ' But, the drafters elected to work instead from the U.S.
draft. 12
Importantly, the rejection of the French draft had nothing to do with
the fact that it contained the phrase "unable [to obtain permission] to
return." The French draft was rejected because it was feared that the
unqualified appeal to Article 14 was too open-ended and that the 1951
Convention should enumerate specific grounds of persecution rather than
leave the construal of "persecution" up to the discretion of member
states. °3 It was feared that without enumerated types of persecution, it
would not be "possible to ascertain, at any moment which were the
groups entitled to effective international protection"' 0 4 but that this was
necessary if the 1951 Convention were to be widely ratified.' 5
The language of "unable to return" was reintroduced independently in
a resolution of the UNGA finalizing the draft which was the ultimate
recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee. This addition is one of the
few changes that the UNGA made to the final draft submitted to it by the
Ad Hoc Committee (via ECOSOC). The Secretary-General notes that
of the Ad Hoc Committee draft to be altered
Article 1 was the only article
06
1
Assembly.
General
by the
101. France Proposal, supra note 45.
102. United States Memorandum, supra note 48. It might be alleged that it was for this
reason that the "unable to obtain permission to return" provision was dropped. However, that
provision is as ascertainable as any other that was enumerated. Also, the U.S. draft which the
drafters elected to work from at this point contained a clause for "displaced persons" and
"unaccompanied children" which would be no less ascertainable than the analogous category of
the French draft.
103. See supranote 69 and accompanying text. See also Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness
and Related Problems, First Session: Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting Held at Lake Success,
New York, on Wednesday, Jan. 18, 1950, 2:15 PM,

8.

104. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, First Session: Summary
Record of the Fifth Meeting held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 18, Jan. 1950,
2:15 PM,

8.

105. Id.
106. U.N. Secretary-General, Texts of the Draft Convention and the Draft Protocol to be
Considered by the Conference: Notefrom the Secretary-General, A/CONF.2/1 (Mar. 12, 1951).
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The draft text submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee to the UNGA in
August of 1950, as we saw in the previous subsection, reads as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'refugee' shall apply
to any person ...

(3) Who has had, or has, well-founded fear of

being the victim of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality or political opinion, as a result of events in Europe
before 1 January 1951, or circumstances directly resulting from
such events, and, owing to such fear, has had to leave, shall leave,
or remains outside the country of his nationality, before or after 1
January 1951, and is unable, or, owing to such fear or for reasons
other than personal convenience, unwilling, to avail himself of the
protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or,
if he has no nationality, has left, shall leave,
or remains outside the
07
residence.'
habitual
former
his
country of
Note the grammar of this draft, in light of what we discuss above in
Part II: there is a comma rather than a semicolon, there is agreement in
verb-tense, and "who" is not repeated. In contrast, the text as modified
and approved by the UNGA in December of that year reads:
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee"
shall apply to any person who: . . . (2) As a result of events

occurring before 1 January 1951, and owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal
convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to
such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is
unwilling to return to it; ... 108
What could possibly have been the purpose of these changes, from a
text whose grammar very clearly calls for a single test, to one whose
grammar suggests otherwise, if not for a recognition that lacking a
nationality and being unable to return (in the stringent sense of unable
that we have argued would have been germane in this context) was in and
of itself sufficient for meriting asylum?
One hypothesis is that the change reflects a recognition that some
displaced stateless persons might not require refugee status: those who
were both willing and able to return by reestablishing their nationality
107.
108.

ECOSOC Res., supra note 87.
G.A. Res. 429/5, 48-49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/429/5 (Dec. 14, 1950).
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with the proper authorities.
But this further qualification could have been added, in ways we
suggest in Part II above, without also changing the comma to a semicolon,
bringing the verb tenses of the clauses out of agreement, or introducing
the extra "who." If the purpose of the UNGA at this stage was not to
capriciously introduce grammatical discrepancies to entertain future
generations of interpreters, we must conclude that in making explicit that
affected stateless persons must either be unable to return or unwilling, it
became obvious to the assembly that there was no need to require that
persons in this group who were unable to return had fled owing to a wellfounded fear. After all the mere fact of lacking a nationality and being
unable to return is already, in the stringent sense in which we hold that
they understood "unable to return," a dire enough lack of fundamental
protection as to merit inclusion in the 1951 Convention. It may well have
been assumed that persecution was the usual cause of this condition, but
that did not matter since the condition speaks for itself.° 9
The Conference of Plenipotentiaries accepted the text of the article
that the UNGA gave them as it stood, except for two alterations. First,
they removed the proviso "for reasons other than personal convenience"
as a ground for unwillingness aside from a well-founded fear of
persecution. We may understand this revision in light of the concerns
0
with enforceability and enumerability that we have discussed above."
The second change is a change that we have already considered in Part
II above: the addition of the temporal restriction phrase "owing to such
events" after the semicolon, to clarify that it was to modify "being outside
the country of his former habitual residence" just as it modified "is
outside the country of his nationality.""' The drafters' reasoning at this
stage very clearly demonstrates an awareness of the relevant point of
grammar: if such a restriction were not made explicit following the
semicolon, it would be unclear whether it were implicitly meant to apply
there or not. But, as we explain above, "owing to a well-founded fear"
occurs in precisely the same grammatical position as "owing to such
events." The only reasonable conclusion is that the drafters did not
require this restriction to apply to the clause following the semicolon. It
109. One may argue that the term "unable to return" is too difficult to define to form part of
the test for refugee status. We invite the reader to recall that "persecution" is similarly vague. As
UNHCR admits, "[tihere is no universally accepted definition of 'persecution,' and various
attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success." Handbook on Procedures,
supra note 4, 51. Our suggestion is that, like "persecution," "unable to return" is a legal term of
art calling for the appropriate level of intellectual care in its interpretation.
110. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
111. Record of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting, supra note 36,
(2)(i) (discussing the
modification made by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries). See also U.N. Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refuges and Stateless Persons, Draft Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Style Committee, UnitedKingdom: Amendment to Article 1, (July 23, 1951).
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follows that the drafters must have understood "unable to return"
stringently, as an irreparable inability, as otherwise it would have been
obvious that a further restriction was called for.
This concludes our review of the object and purpose of the 1951
Convention. We find that, contrary to the standard interpretation, the
object and purpose of the 1951 Convention, as understood first from a
reading of the 1951 Convention in full with its Preamble, and second,
through a careful analysis of legal antecedents to the 1951 Convention,
and third, through an analysis of the travaux themselves, is to extend
surrogate international protection to all those persons who truly needed
it; viz. all persons who suffered from a fundamental or humanitarian loss
of national protection. "Unable to return" covers stateless people who
were vulnerable to falling through the cracks during the scrambling of
states and territories by the war. The generality of this wording was not
an oversight, but may be seen as a deliberate means of solving the very
practical problem of repatriation for people who had nowhere to go
(according to the standards and norms of the laws of nationality then in
effect' 12) by giving them the legal right to make a new home where they
found themselves.
Our account of the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention allows
us to say something that proponents of the standard interpretation cannot:
the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention is in harmony with its
ordinary meaning. The standard interpretation holds there to be a conflict,
and asks us to choose its construal of object and purpose over the
document's ordinary meaning, a construal we argue is incorrect. We hold
that the condition of "unable to return" for stateless people speaks for
itself, requiring no further restriction to persecution, and this is something
about which the ordinary meaning and the object and purpose of the 1951
Convention are in accord.
Once again, this is not to say that we hold that all displaced stateless
persons are refugees. To the contrary; our interpretation gives us a way
of dividing the sphere of application of the 1951 Convention from that of
the Statelessness Conventions so that the two may be understood as
deliberately complementary. The 1951 Convention was intended to assist
all of those displaced stateless persons that the Statelessness Conventions
could not, as the latter Conventions' aims are repatriation and integration
rather than the provision of permanent surrogate international protection.
The Statelessness Conventions are intended to assist claimants who enjoy
a link to some country of origin that the norms of nationality law
recognize, and who do not also face a "social or humanitarian" threat like
persecution, by repatriating them. The 1951 Convention picks up where
112. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, 179
L.N.T.S. 4137 (1937).
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the Statelessness Convention leaves off: by helping those who face some
such "social or humanitarian" threat in returning home, or those who
literally have no home to return to. Only such persons are unable to return.
If the Statelessness Conventions are suited to help a claimant return
home, then that claimant is not unable to return, even if there are various
practical obstacles to their doing so.
To further elaborate on this point, and also to further defend our
interpretation, we turn now to a review of the most relevant state practice.
We will argue here that our issue has never come before the courts. No
court has yet shown a case to be a case of inability to return in our
stringent sense, and yet ineligible for refugee status. This is because
courts have not considered our more stringent conception of "unable to
return," and also because many of the claimants in relevant cases fail to
fall clearly in this category. Thus far, all of those who have clearly and
unquestionably been unable to return in our stringent sense have been
persecuted. We have to look to the future to imagine cases where this is
not so, as we shall do in Part V. For this reason we hold there to be no
substantive conflict between our interpretation and state practice, despite
the fact that many courts have declared that all refugees must be
persecuted. Because these courts have not considered our alternative
interpretation, their declarations to this effect are unnecessary.
The reader who makes it this far will begin to wonder whether the
divergence between our interpretation and the standard interpretation is
anything more than academic. To address this, after we review state
practice, we will consider a scenario that may one day yield a real
divergence between our interpretation and the standard one: persons
rendered stateless owing to the complete submergence of their state
beneath the sea.
IV. STATE

PRACTICE AND SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF THE

1951

CONVENTION

It may be argued that our interpretation is contrary to existing state
practice. Some courts have ruled that unpersecuted claimants may be
eligible for refugee status, but these rulings have for the most part been
overturned on appeal. 13 Here, we examine the municipal case law and
find that there is only a superficial tension; those rulings which conflict
with our interpretation are unnecessary to the justification of the relevant
verdicts, and do not reflect a direct judgment on the validity of our
interpretation. In effect, what is at stake between our interpretation and
113. Two such cases are R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep 't, Ex parte Adan, [1999] 1
A.C. 293 (H.L.); MinisterforImmigration&MulticulturalAffairs v. Savvin (& statement by Katz
J. as of 26 Apr. 2000) (2000), 98 F.C.R. 168 (Austl.).
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the standard interpretation has never been decisively tested.
We divide the cases to be considered into two categories. In the first
class are those cases where the claimant is not stateless. In the second
class are cases where the claimant is stateless. In cases from both
categories judges have reasoned that all refugees must be persecuted. But
in neither class of cases is such a pronouncement necessary to justify the
ruling of the court. In the first class of cases, where the claimant is not
stateless, no pronouncement on the interpretation of the clause following
the semicolon is required, beyond the fact that it applies only to those
who are stateless. In the second class of cases, the question of whether
the claimants are unable to return in our stringent sense is not addressed.
But this could provide an alternative rationale for denying refugee status
to relevant claimants.
The principally important case in the first category is Ex parteAdan.
Mr. Adan had left his country, Somalia, due to a well-founded fear of
persecution, but was later unable to return, he argued, due to the ongoing14
civil war, though the causes of his persecution no longer existed."
Accordingly he applied for protection under the clause following the
semicolon. Lord Lloyd of Berwick stated that, "Mr. Adan must show that
he is (not was) unable to avail himself of the protection of his country. If
one asks 'protection against what?' the answer must surely be, or at least
include, protection against persecution."'115 Lord Lloyd here expresses a
view on why the claimant should not qualify as a refugee under the clause
preceding the semicolon. But these remarks are not germane to the
question of whether Mr. Adan qualified under the clause following the
semicolon. This question was settled in the negative by the fact that Mr.
Adan was in fact a citizen of Somalia. 1 16 Though Somalia arguably lacked
a centralized government at the time, Mr. Adan was not de jure stateless.
Though in this case Lord Lloyd has occasion to argue that all refugees
must have a forward looking fear of persecution in reply to some
comments made by the lower court, 1 7 this is dicta not necessary to the
decision.
Another case worth mentioning is AF (Kiribati)(2013) Immigration
andProtection Tribunal,New Zealand in which the appellant, a native of
Kiribati, asked for asylum from sea level rise associated with climate
change, which threatens his livelihood and well-being on Kiribati, a low
lying island state at extreme risk from climate change. 118 The court denied
114.
115.

R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ExparteAdan, [1999] 1 A.C. 293 (H.L.).
Id.

116. Id. We do not here discuss whether or not a "failed state" may qualify as a state for
purposes of citizenship rights, as this is beyond the limits of this Article.
117. See id. at 304 (statement by Lord Lloyd). See also Revenko v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500,
139-40 (U.K.).
118. Kiribati [2013] NXIPT 800413 (N.Z).
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the refugee claim based on the argument that climate change is not
persecution. 119 Notably, the court recognized that climate change is
affecting the entire population of Kiribati, not just the applicant, and that
120
it might one day cause the destruction of the entire chain of islands.
Yet while the threat of annihilation to the population of Kiribati was
touched upon during the case, the court found this event was not
"imminent," and the issue of statelessness never arose.' 2 ' We will discuss
further the issue of sinking states. But even in our view, such an applicant
is not stateless, though his great-grandchildren may one day be.
We come now to cases of more direct concern: cases where the
claimants are indeed stateless, and so potentially eligible for refugee
status under the clause following the semicolon. We will argue that in
such cases as they have come before the courts so far, no verdict has yet
been issued which addresses and rejects our interpretation. Also, our
interpretation as we have defended it here is not committed to a fixed
construal of just exactly how dire one's circumstances must be for one's
difficulties in returning to count as an inability: as "unable to return" is a
term of art, this is for the courts to decide. Thus our interpretation is
consistent with many denials of refugee status: one needs simply take
such a verdict as in part a verdict on the proper construal of "unable to
return."
There are several recent cases where the court has reasoned, in
justifying its verdict, that stateless persons may only be eligible for
refugee status if they have a well-founded fear of persecution. In some of
these cases the court also finds the claimant to be able to return.
Accordingly the reasoning that all stateless persons must have a wellfounded fear of persecution to qualify for refugee status is clearly dicta
in these cases, since the claimant's ineligibility under the "unable to
return" test is already established. Cases fitting this pattern include
123
Thabet v. Canada'2 2 and Maaroufv. Canada.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. 54.
Id. 75.
Id. 91.
Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 4 F.C. 21 (Can.).

The claimant, a stateless Palestinian, argued he was unable to return to any of his countries of
former habitual residence, which included the United States and Kuwait. The court acknowledged
that stateless persons would be frequently denied the right to return to countries of habitual
residence, but that such a denial did not always constitute persecution. We concur, and we note in
addition that in some cases being denied the right to return also does not amount to an inability to
return in our stringent sense: to evaluate this we should have to look into the specifics of the case,
and whether the provisions of the Statelessness Conventions could at least in principle be brought
to bear. However, this is academic here since the court ultimately found that the claimant was able
to return to one of his former countries of residence, Kuwait, without any trouble, and therefore
that the Convention did not apply.
123. Maarouf v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 93 A. 343
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In other cases, the court considers the claimant unable to return, and
rules that such claimants must also show a well-founded fear of
persecution. Cases of this sort include Revenko v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department124 and Ministerfor Immigration & Multicultural
Affairs v Savvin.' 25 Our primary contention concerning both of these
cases is that the justices did not consider the question of ability to return
in the stringent light that it should have been considered. These are both
difficult cases, but this is precisely because it is difficult to assess whether
these claimants really were unable to return (in the stringent sense).
However, in neither case is this difficulty addressed: in both cases the
justices take the inability of the claimants to return to be a given. But this
(Can.). The claimant, a stateless Palestinian, argued he had no legal right to return to his country
of former residence, Kuwait, at the time the case was adjudicated. While the court found it was
true that the claimant had no right to return to Kuwait at the time, they found he was able to return
to Lebanon, another country of former residence. Incidentally, it is not the case that on our
interpretation the claimant would have passed the "inability" test if Kuwait were the only country
to which he enjoyed any link. "Unable to return" for us does not simply mean that one faces some
legal impediment to returning, even if this is in the form of having been deprived of the right to
return. The question is whether this right may be restored under the provisions of the Statelessness
Conventions. The court makes an interesting comment on this score:
The argument that habitual residence necessitates the claimant be legally able to
return to that state is contrary to the shelter rationale underlying international
refugee protection. Once a stateless persons has abandoned the country of his
former habitual residence for the reasons indicated in the definition, he is usually
unable to return. As a final act of persecution a state could strip a person of his
right to return to that country. Thus, to require that a claimant have a legal right
of return would allow the persecuting state control over the claimant's recourse
to the Convention and effectively undermine its humanitarian purpose.
Id. at 2.
124. See Revenko v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500 (U.K.).
Revenko was born in Moldova. He claimed asylum in the United Kingdom in 1991. The special
adjudicator found him to be stateless, and the IAT found him to be unable to return to Moldova.
This did not come into question during the trial; the question was whether this alone sufficed to
render him eligible for refugee status, despite his lack of any well-founded fear of persecution.
125. See Ministerfor Immigration & MulticulturalAffairs v Savvin (& statement by Katz J.
as of 26 Apr. 2000) (2000), 98 F.C.R. 168 (Austl.). The claimants, who lacked a nationality
because they lost their citizenship during the breakup of the Soviet Union and failed to acquire a
new citizenship, applied for refugee status on the basis of inability to return. The primary judge,
Judge Dowsett, had ruled in their favor, but the appellate judges Spender, Drummond and Katz
overturned the ruling. Drummond rules, "I do not think that as much weight can be given to the
semicolon in the Article as [the lower court judge] ascribes to it in the task of interpreting an
international treaty." Id. 24. See also inter alia, 7, 8, 22, 23, 72, 75. None of the three appellate
justices consider the possibility that "unable to return" in the 1951 Convention has a more
stringent meaning. The claimants were able to return to Latvia and apply for citizenship based on
their residence in that country. The claimants faced no significant "social or humanitarian"
impediment to doing so. For this reason, we hold it to be far from established that the claimants
should count as "unable to return."
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is just to say that they do not consider our interpretation, since on our
interpretation this would be a matter that would call for expert reasoning
and judgment, and indeed it might be found that the claimants were not
unable to return.
Perhaps more importantly, in both of these cases, the judges put a
considerable amount of weight on the fact of the drafters' clear intention
to treat the majority of stateless persons separately from refugees, and
indeed to draft a separate convention (or two, as it turned out) on their
behalf. 126 But this assumes that if "unable to return" is not supplemented
with some further test, all displaced stateless persons would count as
refugees, and as we have argued, this is unwarranted. Moreover, the
circumstances of the decision to draft separate conventions are evidence
in favor of our interpretation: the reasoning was not that the persecuted
should be treated separately from the non-persecuted, but that those
whose lack of protection was a "humanitarian" concern should be
differentiated from those whose lack was a merely "legal" matter. This
supports a reading of "unable to return" as characterizing a more
fundamental or "humanitarian" kind of difficulty in returning as opposed
to a merely temporary or legal problem. Thus, this fact about the drafting
to which the judges in Revenko and Savvin appeal does not favor the
standard interpretation over our interpretation.
Another contention that shows up regularly in the case law is that the
persecution test must be applied to all stateless claimants because there
should be a "single test" for refugee status. Lord Justice Pill states '1 in
27
Revenko, "Article lA(2). ..set[s] out a single test for refugee status."
In Thabet, Judge Linden states:
Statelessness does not give a person an advantage over those who
are not stateless... [t]he definition takes into account the inherent
difference between those persons who are nationals of a state, and
therefore are owed protection, and those persons who are stateless
and without recourse to state protection. Because of this distinction
one cannot treat the two groups identically, even though one

126. See Revenko v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500,

8-

11, 60, 64, 94, 95, 143, 144 (U.K.); Ministerfor Immigration& MulticulturalAffairs v Savvin (&
statement by Katz J.as of 26 Apr. 2000) (2000), 98 F.C.R. 168,
20, 23, 72 (Austl.).

127. Revenko v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500 (U.K.). For
a summary of the "view now generally accepted" on a single test for refugee status, see GuY S.
GOODWrN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-70 (2007). We are

not alone in questioning that the drafters intended a single test, or that a single test is the
appropriate conclusion to draw from the drafting history. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, "Report on
Behalf of the Appellant," July 23, 2000 (unpublished), prepared for Revenko v. Secretary of State
for the Home Dep't United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and Wales), July 31,2000, 3640, cited by permission.
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28

129
Other courts concur.
Insofar as these claims purport to be claims about the broader purpose
of the 1951 Convention, we have addressed them above. For example, as
we have seen, the moment in the travaux most naturally taken to provide
most support to the "single test" approach advocated by Justice Pill and
others, in fact supports the opposite conclusion. This is the moment where
the drafters at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries elected to treat stateless
persons and non-stateless persons as equal in that both should be bound
by the temporal restrictionincluded in the text at that time, but they did
not choose to repeat the restriction to persecution. The temporal
restriction and the restriction to a well-founded fear of persecution were
parts of the very same conjunctive clause, but the drafters chose to repeat
only one of those conjuncts,
the temporal restriction, in the clause
30
following the semicolon.'
But if the "single test" approach was not part of the object and purpose
of the 1951 Convention, there is little else to speak for it. It is far from
clear that there is anything inherently wrong in treating stateless and nonstateless persons by different criteria, appropriate to the different ways in
which they are vulnerable. There are very real differences between
stateless and non-stateless persons. Nor are we alone in saying so.
Though the court in Thabet may have taken persecution to be a constraint
on any claimant, it nevertheless displays a willingness to treat stateless
and non-stateless persons to a different standard. The court held that a
stateless person did not need to show persecution in all of his or her
countries of former habitual residence, but rather must; "demonstrate that
one country was guilty of persecution and that the claimant is unable or
unwilling to return to any of the states where he [or she] formerly
habitually resided . ..We must . ..properly take into account the
situations where claimants have other possible safe havens."'' But this
reasoning suggests that inability to return without persecution can play a
determinative role. It follows from this reasoning that if two stateless
claimants, both persecuted in one country, differ only in whether they are
able to return to a second, then they differ over eligibility for refugee
status.

128.

Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 4 F.C. 21 (Can.).

129.

See, e.g., Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Appeal No. 72635/01, (2002)

65-68

(N.Z.) (noting concurrence of opinion in multiple other cases).
130. See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 11, at 68-70, n.92; Revenko v. Sec'y of
State for the Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500,
89-93 (U.K.); our discussion supra parts
II & III.F.
131. Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 4 F.C. 21, 13

(Can.).
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The "single test" approach has also led to problematic results,
generally in contexts where "protection" is thought of as "protection
from" a persecutory regime, rather than the provision of the basic rights
associated with nationality. For example, the Board whose ruling was
overturned in Maaroufheld; "since by his own evidence he cannot be
returned there it is patently absurd to argue that he requires protection
from being there."' 32 But as the court found in Maarouf this is to miss
the critical point that the right to reside is itself a fundamental
protection. 133
There is an inherent flaw, as the courts in Thabet and Maaroufappear
to have implicitly recognized, in treating stateless persons and nonstateless persons to the identical standard in claiming international
protection, for if stateless persons truly, fundamentally are unable to
return to any country of former habitual residence then their protection
relationships with those countries have irreparably broken down and they
require surrogate international protection in the form of asylum, whether
or not they are persecuted.
The rationale underlying international refugee protection is as the
Supreme Court of Canada stated in Canada v. Ward, "to serve as
'surrogate shelter' coming into play only upon failure of national
support." 134 Arguably, this specifies the "single test" which all refugees
must pass. We concur that the category of refugee was meant to be
unified; we only disagree that what unifies it is the persecution test.
We now briefly discuss here several other themes of argumentation
present in Revenko and elsewhere:. the question of whether the
enumeration of grounds in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, on nonrefoulement, may inform the interpretation of l(A)(2),' 35 the question of
whether the UNHCR Handbook or other guidelines, such as those
adopted in 1996 by the Council of Europe, may inform the interpretation
of l(A)(2), 36 and finally the question of whether it is not misguided to
attach any weight to the literal construction of the text of an international
37
treaty.

132. Maarouf v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 93 A 343
(Can.). See also HATHAWAY, supra note 26.
133. Maarouf [1993] 93 A 343, 12 (Can.).
134. Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 752 (Can.).
135. In Revenko, two of the three justices hold that article 33 may be read so as to constrain
the interpretation of 1(A)(2). See Revenko v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A.
Civ. 500,
69-74 (Lord Justice Pill), 115 (Lord Justice Clarke) (U.K.). However, Lord Justice
Bennett dissents. Id. 126.
136. Revenko, [20001 E.W.C.A. Civ. 500,
41-46, 65, 97-103, 136 (U.K.). Id. 35, 103

(concerning the Council of Europe's guidelines).
137. Id.
18-20, 68, 80, 81, 92, 107, 108, 122-24; Minister for Immigration &
MulticulturalAffairs v Savvin (& statement by Katz J as of 26 Apr. 2000) (2000), 98 F.C.R. 168,
7 3, 8, 24 (Austl.).
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Concerning the relevance of Article 33 on non-refoulement, it has
long been the established view of the UNHCR that Article 33 cannot be
used to restrict the interpretation of Article 1, and should itself be
construed broadly. 138 According to Lauterpacht, non-refoulement has its
own jus cogens history, and is held to apply (as a jus cogens principle)
even in cases where refugee status does not apply, such as cases of torture,
and in such cases the question of the applicability of the enumerated
grounds (the exact cause of the threat of torture or other serious harm) is
"not material. 139
Concerning the applicability of the UNHCR handbook, as the justices
in Revenko note, the Handbook is not law.140 Lord Justice Pill notes that
the 1988 edition of the Handbook states, "[a]s the Handbook has been
conceived as a practical guide and not as a treatise on refugee law,
references to literature, etc. have purposely been omitted."''
Accordingly, the Handbook is at best only indirect evidence of the
direction state practice has taken, and does not constitute criterial
elements of that practice.
In contrast, the actions of regional bodies like the Council of Europe,
as well as the introduction of various domestic laws and regional
agreements concerning refugees, may well constitute state practice.
However, if we are to appeal to such elements we must be
comprehensive. While the Council of Europe's 1996 guidelines may
understand refugee status in terms of persecution, other more binding
documents, such as the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, 14 2 or the 1974
Organization of African Unity Convention, 143 allow for refugees that are
not persecuted. The upshot of an analysis of state practice on this score
generally speaking is therefore inconclusive, but there is at least as
powerful of a case that it calls for a more inclusive definition of refugee
that does not in all cases restrict attention to persecuted persons.
Finally, we have not offered any challenge here to the thesis that
where there is a conflict between literal construction and the object and
purpose of an international treaty, that the correct interpretation will look
to the object and purpose. What we have argued is that the 1951
Convention is not an example of such a conflict: its literal construction is
138. Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 55, 99, 111, 128, 133, 139, 219, 253.
139. Id. See also Revenko, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500, 126 (U.K.) (noting the concurring
opinion of Justice Bennet).
42, 97 (U.K.).
140. Revenko, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500,
141.

Id.

142. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Regional Refugee Instruments & Related,
CartagenaDeclarationon Refugees, Colloquium on the InternationalProtection of Refugees in
Central America, Mexico and Panama (Nov. 22, 1984), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae
6b36ec.html.
143. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
Organization of African Unity (OAU), Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
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in harmony with its object and purpose.
We conclude that the case law has nothing dispositive to say against
the correctness of our interpretation: no case has tested the question of
whether the 1951 Convention involves a stringent reading of "unable to
return" or whether instead the 1951 Convention involves a less stringent
reading of "unable to return" taken together with some additional
requirement of persecution. We conclude more generally that the
grammar of the 1951 Convention is not mistaken or misleading. The
grammar deliberately reflects the distinction between the Statelessness
Conventions and the 1951 Convention, between those who require
international protection and those who require assistance in the
restoration of protection in their country of origin. It coherently reflects
that someone who lacks a nationality and is unable to return to their
country of former habitual residence is a refugee, whether or not this
inability is a result of persecution. "Inability" as it occurs in the clause
following the semicolon means irreparable, fundamental inability, not
mere difficulty or complication with the paperwork or conflict of laws
along the way. The broader purpose of the 1951 Convention was to offer
protection to those whose protection relationship with their country of
origin was irreparable, and for whom a surrogate relationship was
therefore required. We suggest that the language of the 1951 Convention,
including the phrase "unable to return," was crafted with that aim in
mind. 144
We turn now to the final aim of our Article. We have seen that the
difference between our interpretation and the standard interpretation has
not yet been tested. But the difference is not merely academic. Should it
come to pass, displaced inhabitants of uninhabitable island nations will
be 1951 Convention refugees if our interpretation is correct, but not if the
standard interpretation is correct. We turn now to a brief account of why
144. We have not argued that the ordinary meaning of the 1951 Convention includes
provisions for all persons who irreparably lack protection in their country of nationality or former
habitual residence. It is an open question whether persons with a nationality may fall in this
category without being persecuted, but the ordinary meaning of the 1951 Convention obviously
requires persecution for those claimants with a nationality. Other issues arise because, though
"unable to return" had a more stringent meaning than some commentators have held, it is not clear
just exactly how stringent it must be. A curious case is that of nomadic migrants who have no
effective link to any state but who also cannot be said to have had a former habitual residence,
because they resided in no place in any habitual way. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.) [1955] I.C.J.
1. If such persons found themselves unable to enter any country they might count as irreparably
unprotected, though whether they fall through the cracks of the Convention would hinge on how
"former habitual residence" is assessed. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers,
Recommendation No. R(83)], Of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Stateless
Nomads And Nomads of UndeterminedNationality (Feb. 22, 1983). More generally, the ordinary

meaning of the 1951 Convention obviously does not make provisions for all persons who are,
given today's broader conception of the class of state protections that are the legitimate concern
of international human rights law, irreparably lacking in any of that broader set of protections.
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this is so.
V. SUBMERGED STATES

Sea levels are rising so fast that, within a hundred years, low lying
island states such as Kiribati and the Maldives may become permanently
uninhabitable, or even completely submerged underwater.I15 It is to be
hoped that some environmental, technological or political solution will
be found in time, but if not, then eventually the citizens of these states
will be forced to migrate abroad. We claim that in the worst-case
scenario, if no solution for them is found, these forced migrants will
qualify for refugee status, though they will not be persecuted.
For this to be true, they must satisfy three conditions: they must lack
a nationality, they must be outside of their country of former habitual
residence, and they must be unable to return to that country.1 46 In our
paper Sinking into Stateless, 147 we argue at length that these persons will
indeed lack a nationality in the sense of the 1951 Convention and the
Statelessness Conventions, because their submerged nations will lose
their legal status as nations, though they may retain some degree of nonstate sovereignty, similar to that enjoyed by the Sovereign Military Order
of Malta, or the Holy See. 148 Accordingly, recognition as a national of
145. CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 694 (Martin L.
Party et al. eds., 2007). See also JANE McADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (2012).
146. Helene Lambert, Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality and Refugee Status:
ComparativePerspectiveson the Overlap Between Statelessness andRefugee Status, INT'L COMP.
L.Q. 26 (forthcoming Jan. 2015). Lambert points out that state practice "is consistent in denying
protection if obstacles are purely practical," but that "practical" means "a lack of proper ID or
travel documents." As we have discussed, our definition of "unable" is much more stringent in
keeping with the drafters' intention to provide a humanitarian solution for the dire situation of
refugees.
147. Heather Alexander & Jonathan Simon, Sinking into Statelessness, 19 TILBURG L. REv.
20 (2014).
148. To establish this claim, we first review the law of nations as it has developed since the
Treaty of Westphalia, and we find an almost universal consensus that control of habitable territory
is a necessary precondition for an entity to be a State. This view is expressed ubiquitously in
commentary and through practice, and also explicitly in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 I.N.T.S. 19. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (6th ed. 2003); JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (2d. ed. 2006); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 409
(5th ed. 2003). We then consider an objection, given voice at a recent U.N. expert meeting at
Bellagio, to the effect that the principle of presumption of continuity of state existence tells against
applying this criterion in the case of sinking island states. The focus of our previous article is in
showing why the principle of presumption of continuity of state existence is not dispositive here.
Alexander & Simon, supra note 142; UNHCR Expert Meeting on Climate Change and
Displacement, Feb. 22-25, 2011, Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and
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one of these entities will no longer amount to being considered as a
national by a State. Accordingly, those in this position who lack any other
nationality will no longer be considered a national by any State under the
operation of its law. They will therefore meet the legal definition
of de
49
jure statelessness as it occurs in the Statelessness Conventions.
But if we are correct that completely and permanently uninhabitable
island nations will not in the legal sense be States, then it follows that
those who have had to flee them will be outside of their countries of
former habitual residence and be unable to return. We argue for this now.
First, "outside of their countries of former habitual residence": there
is no requirement that the country of one's former habitual residence still
exists in order that one count as being outside of it. In many documented
cases of statelessness, it is precisely because one's former
country of
50
residence has ceased to exist that one is now stateless)
This leaves "unable to return." The aim of this Article has been to
show that this phrase must be understood far more stringently than many
commentators have done. The mere existence of some hindrances and
obstacles to returning, even legal ones, does not necessarily indicate a
genuine inability to return in the sense of the 1951 Convention.
But the case we are considering here is a case of perhaps the most
stringent sense of inability to return imaginable: the physical
impossibility of returning. We are considering the possibility that a
country like the Maldives or Kiribati becomes completely submerged
beneath the sea, or comes close enough to it as to become completely
uninhabitable. Of course, it will still be possible to return in a boat to the
water where the land once was and perhaps to make a temporary landing
on the rocky outcroppings that remain, but "return" means return with the
purpose of residing. Such a return will in the cases we are considering be
something that claimants are unable to achieve in the most stringent sense
imaginable: it will be physically impossible.
Again, we only consider here the case where it is reasonable to expect
that the uninhabitability of the relevant territory is permanent. If some
technological, environmental or political solution were to present itself,
so that we might expect that the relevant land would soon be reclaimed
from the sea, or that land from elsewhere would be ceded in perpetuity to
the affected state, it would no longer be clear that affected persons would
lack a nationality and be unable to return, for the stringent sense of
"inability" that we take to be operative in the 1951 Convention might
arguably be thought of as owing to some condition that possibly will not
Displacement, 2, 30. See also Maxine Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change,
DeterritorializedNationhoodandthe Post-climate Era, 2 CLMIATE LAW 345 (2011).
149. 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 14, art. 1.1.
150.

See, e.g., Ministerfor Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Savvin (& statement by

Katz J. as of 26 Apr. 2000) (2000) 98 F.C.R. 168 (Austl.).
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change. 1 1
But our result is significant even with this proviso: should worst come
to worst for this vulnerable group, and no technological, environmental
or political solution present itself, if the interpretation of the 1951
Convention that we have here defended is correct, then these persons will
be eligible to claim asylum under that 1951 Convention, even if they
suffer neither persecution nor fear thereof. Refugee status may be a
solution of last resort for these persons, but this is exactly what asylum
has always been.
VI. CONCLUSION

We have argued that the ordinary meaning, the object and purpose,
and state practice concerning the 1951 Convention are in accord: the
clause following the semicolon of 1(A)(2) does not involve any
restriction to a well-founded fear of persecution for those who lack a
nationality and are unable to return. They may be outside of their
countries of former habitual residence for any reason whatever: if they
lack a nationality and are truly unable to return, they qualify for 1951
Convention refugee status. "Unable to return" is a more stringent
constraint than some commentators have taken it to be, but the
hypothetical case of displaced islanders shows that it need not, in
principle, be due to persecution. Our argument also establishes a natural
complementarity between the 1951 Convention and the Statelessness
Conventions: a stateless person who cannot be assisted by the latter will,
as a rule, be eligible for assistance under the former.
Our result has a limited but welcome practical consequence: in order
to legally grant asylum to the displaced inhabitants of completely
submerged or uninhabitable states, we need not advocate for an
expansion of refugee law to cover all climate migrants, nor need we twist
the characterization of persecution so that displaced islanders somehow
count as persecuted by their own submerged countries. We need only bear
in mind that it is fundamental lack of basic national protection, rather than
persecution that is at the heart of the 1951 Convention.
We reiterate that this is a limited result. By no means does it obviate
151.

In such a case, cessation of refugee status would perhaps become appropriate. The

relevant clause of the 1951 Convention states; "He can no longer, because the circumstances in
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse
to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality..." 1951 Convention, supra

note 3, art. 1(C)(5). Cessation of refugee status is an entire topic within itself, but an overview is
contained within U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on InternationalProtection:
Cessation of Refugee Status under Article IC(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/03 (Feb. 10, 2003).
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the need for further international and legal agreements to assist the plight
of those affected by climate change. First of all, if our argument is correct,
one does not count as a refugee just because one's island is submerging;
one only counts as a refugee once one's island is submerged, or
uninhabitable. But the consequences of waiting until then to begin to
manage migratory flows would be disastrous. 152 Second of all, many
people's lives may be ruined by climate change though their countries are
not rendered entirely uninhabitable. The more general problem is not
whether a country is habitable, strictly speaking, but whether a country
will have the resources to sustain its population. Our result here does little
to remedy this more general problem and in no way should be considered
to be a substitute or replacement for the needed further developments of
international and regional law. These are developments that we will only
achieve though the concentrated and coordinated efforts of the
international community.
Nevertheless, our result offers some small glimmer of hope for those
in this most direly imperiled group. In a time of devastating international
policy failures, we may hope, in at least some cases, to return to the
principles of basic human dignity won by an earlier generation.

152. Though preventative measures are called for here, they would not be without precedent.
Consider, for example, the application of refugee status to a forward-looking fear of persecution,
or assistance to persons at risk of statelessness.
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